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Adam Biggs and Rees Lee
THE ROLE OF THE HUMAN OPERATOR IN THE 
THIRD OFFSET STRATEGY
 The Third Offset Strategy has become a common topic of discussion in De-partment of Defense (DoD) circles� In these debates, people regularly throw 
around new ideas about research and development (R&D) priorities, as well as 
about the often-desired deliverables, the shiny new toys—people love widgets 
they can hold or capabilities they can see in the form of new equipment� But these 
research initiatives are about more than the technology� Like its predecessors, the 
Third Offset Strategy is truly about maintaining American military superiority—
a critical point sometimes lost amid fascinating debates about artificial intel-
ligence (AI) and swarms of learning machines on the battlefield� Specifically, the 
Third Offset Strategy is not about securing future battlefield capabilities in the 
twenty-second or twenty-third century; it is about securing our advantage for the 
next ten or twenty years� Today’s active-duty personnel need to see these benefits 
for battles they will fight but that have not yet begun�
This defined timeline is not a simple discussion point; it is the linchpin that 
keeps the conversation focused� Third Offset discussions regularly are given a 
wide berth when it comes to potential technologies, so a second point becomes 
critical to maintaining good order and discipline in the debate: that military R&D 
does not begin or end with the Third Offset Strategy� The initiative is a guidepost 
that will point to a series of research priorities for the near future� Not all R&D 
projects will fall under this initiative, nor should we ignore futuristic science that 
falls completely beyond its current scope� Instead, we can use the Third Offset 
Strategy to define a series of plausible research priorities to guide resource al-
location, funding, and desired deliverables or outcomes� A related consideration 
is that the goals cannot be research-only deliverables� It is not enough to deliver 
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   97 5/1/18   11:10 AM
1
Biggs and Lee: The Role of the Human Operator in the Third Offset Strategy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 9 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
a buggy prototype or to push the science forward; these initiatives must yield 
tangible battlespace advantages for our personnel�
Already we have not started this article in the way that most Third Offset 
Strategy discussions begin� We did not lead by outlining technology objectives or 
descriptions of the previous offset strategies—and there are several good reasons 
why� First, lists of technological objectives split off in many different directions 
more quickly than a company of young sailors or Marines on their first special 
liberty� Second, this offset is not actually about the technology� The new gadgets 
will prove useful, but our focus should be on the human operators—our person-
nel are the most critical component to continued operational success� Moreover, 
we have a near-unique opportunity to leap forward in optimizing human per-
formance� Third, the current offset strategy is not like its predecessors� It will 
become necessary later in this discussion to contrast and compare the different 
offset strategy examples, but right now—at the onset of this offset—the purpose 
of discussion must be to establish priorities, tangible deliverables, and a timeline� 
• Our priorities are determined by the resources we have and the adversaries 
we face�
• Our tangible deliverables are determined by the realistic improvements and 
advancements that are possible within the relevant time frame�
• Our timeline covers the first half of the twenty-first century� 
Now we can get started; we can move on to the question that must be answered 
before the Third Offset can move forward—the multibillion-dollar question: 
What should our Third Offset Strategy actually be?
ENHANCED HUMAN PERFORMANCE:  
THE GOAL OF THE THIRD OFFSET STRATEGY
We propose that enhancing human performance should be the ultimate goal of 
the Third Offset Strategy� To clarify this point: we are not suggesting a minimal 
or irrelevant role for technology within this agenda; technology will prove just 
as critical as in the previous offset strategies� Instead we are saying that the tech-
nologies developed should provide new operational capabilities or enhancement 
opportunities for the human operator�
This approach builds on a theme that we will mention again and again, be-
cause it should be a critical underlying philosophy of the Third Offset Strategy: 
let the computers do what they do best, and let the humans do what they do 
best� Computers are much better than humans at processing raw information, so 
let the computers crunch the numbers and feed that information to the human 
operators� However, computers cannot clear rooms or steer ships� Human opera-
tors remain the backbone of our operational capabilities, so human performance 
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remains crucial to our tactical success� Let the computers give better information 
to our human operators and improve the human operators’ capabilities, and the 
combined effect will be increased operational effectiveness�
Although the human performance element has been the one constant in five 
thousand years of warfare on this planet, what has changed is the capabilities 
and opportunities that are emerging or newly available—i�e�, just at our finger-
tips—today� We divide these opportunities into three overlapping areas: (1) cyber 
initiatives, (2) human-machine integration, and (3) precision selection/training�
We suggest—somewhat counterintuitively—that consideration of cyber initia-
tives, although they represent the most technological thrust of the Third Offset, 
can remain within the scope of human performance considerations� These as-
pects remain amenable to the theme of “let the computers do what they do best�” 
The various initiatives can create better information-processing systems so the 
most useful, most accurate, and most reliable information is delivered to the hu-
man operator who makes the critical decision�
Human-machine teaming represents a subject often considered within the 
scope of Third Offset Strategy projects� This category involves a wide array of 
opportunities to enhance human performance by integrating machine products 
and programs directly into critical tasks� For example, augmented-reality (AR) 
systems can improve performance by delivering updated information directly 
into a heads-up display (HUD)� We now have the ability to integrate humans 
and machines in complex ways that result in true interdependence and yield 
superior performance attributes that neither the machine nor the human alone 
could achieve�
This article is set apart from most other Third Offset Strategy discussions by 
its consideration of the third opportunity: precision selection/training� Together 
with improving the machines (cyber initiatives) and improving the integration of 
machines into human performance (human-machine teaming), this aspect com-
pletes our triad of enhanced human performance by directly improving the way 
we select and train the humans in the loop (precision selection/training)� In this 
area, we recommend using various initiatives such as so-called big data to inform 
our selection procedures, thereby taking advantage of the wealth of information 
that modern technology makes available�
Additionally, we recommend some large “cultural” changes in training proce-
dures� Recent scientific advancements have opened new training opportunities, 
enabling us to begin training individuals on the basis of their individual needs� 
Rather than every Marine receiving the same training, individualized training 
protocols can address specific performance deficiencies or help an individual 
reach a particular goal or acquire a particular skill set required for a specific duty� 
This approach would make some training assessments more akin to medical 
NWC_Summer2018Review.indb   99 5/1/18   11:10 AM
3
Biggs and Lee: The Role of the Human Operator in the Third Offset Strategy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 1 0 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
assessments, with their related individualized treatment plans. There is already a 
model in place on which we can build: special operations. Our proposed preci-
sion selection/training ideas would use individual assessments and special opera-
tions forces (SOFs) training as the models for applying these techniques more 
widely, to the military at large.
These three components (cyber initiatives, human-machine teaming, and 
precision selection/training) represent our Performance Enhancement Triad, the 
overall model we recommend to guide Third Offset Strategy R&D. The article 
will now delve more deeply into each aspect of the triad.
Cyber Initiatives
Modern warfare no longer is limited to the physical battlefields of the sea, sky, 
and land. The ability to use global communication and data networks to disrupt 
directly the energy, financial, political, and military sectors of a nation is a reality. 
The most effective warrior of the future battlefield may not be the Marine with 
the rifle but the sailor or airman at a computer in Colorado. The conception of 
enhanced human performance needs to broaden enough to include these cyber 
warriors.
Achieving the human-performance goals articulated by the Third Offset Strategy will require R&D initiatives on 
three fronts: (1) information-technology and cyber initiatives, especially in the areas of effective use of multiple, big 
datasets and assisted decision-making; (2) precision selection and training of human operators to ensure that the 
right operator is assigned the right task and receives task-specific training individualized to his or her needs; and (3) 
optimized human-machine integration, including simulated environments such as virtual and augmented realities.
PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT TRIAD 
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One illustration of enhancing human performance in the sphere of cyber 
warfare involves deep-learning systems� Machines can be used for cyber defense 
and electronic warfare; this may involve analyzing, for example, tens of thou-
sands of social-media posts to identify critical data patterns that might be of 
use� Other technologies may sense unknown radar signals and help pilots sort 
tremendous amounts of information in real time without needing to return to 
base to conduct the analysis�1 Either example represents a cyber initiative that 
attempts to circumvent the traditional limits of human performance� However, 
both systems actually are providing valuable information to the human opera-
tor to enable an eventual decision and reaction� Third Offset technologies, even 
seemingly cyber-only investments, fundamentally enhance human performance 
by creating new capabilities for the operator� The deep-learning systems remain 
a good example of a single “machine” that quickly can perform an operation that 
otherwise might take a single human operator weeks, thereby allowing real-time 
decision-making based on the most complete data analysis ever delivered to a 
combat environment�
Another emerging cyber initiative centers on antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) 
capabilities, or operations in denied and degraded environments� Any major 
operation depends on the ability to move forces rapidly in theater� Some analysts 
have even referred to operational warfare as an empty concept if forces are unable 
to conduct large-scale movements on land, at sea, and in the air�2 Classic A2/AD 
methods have been aimed at denying a human operator access to some location; 
scenarios ranged from medieval caltrops stopping a cavalry charge to the use 
of various forms of land mines� In any such case, the goal involves protecting 
friendly forces, blocking enemy forces by denying them access, or both� Anti-
A2/AD initiatives attempt to overcome these area-denial strategies� They can 
take one of two approaches: breaching the enemy’s A2/AD systems or enhancing 
friendly A2/AD capabilities� Third Offset substrategies could focus on enhanc-
ing the human operator’s ability to breach an area’s defenses� For example, new 
exoskeletons could reduce the danger to a human operator while he or she physi-
cally breaks through the enemy’s front lines�3 In the cyber arena, Third Offset 
technologies could extend the ability of the human operator to analyze quickly 
the status of global networks, then develop strategies to deny enemy forces access 
to the networks controlling energy, communications, navigation, and other criti-
cal infrastructures vital to waging war� On the flip side of the cyber coin, other 
Third Offset initiatives could pursue new technologies to ensure unimpeded 
cyber access by friendly forces� New A2/AD systems will need to survive cyber 
attacks and other enhanced defensive capabilities if our human operators and 
Second Offset technologies are going to continue to have the same impact on 
future operations�
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Human-Machine Integration
Augmented performance through human-machine integration represents per-
haps the most commonly cited component of the Third Offset Strategy� Aug-
mented performance would enhance the human operator by providing more 
information, increasing functional capability, or maximizing performance and 
endurance in austere environments� The goal is to enhance situational awareness 
and operational performance by giving the operator directly everything he or she 
needs in the most convenient and expedient manner possible�
The foremost example of this idea is already well into development� Specifi-
cally, helmets can be equipped with AR aspects to create better HUDs than any 
prior system� The best-known example at present is the F-35 helmet, which can 
allow the pilot to “see” through the aircraft�4 This capability was made possible by 
advances in AR, which differs in several ways from virtual reality (VR) systems� 
With VR, the technology creates a self-contained world; all stimuli are created 
within that visual system, with no reliance on the physical world around the 
operator� In comparison, an AR environment does not create a self-contained 
world, but merely augments the world around the user by introducing computer- 
generated elements� Pilots wearing AR helmets still can see their cockpits, but 
other information will appear on their visors, such as current heading and 
altitude� The F-35 helmet uses this technology and cameras embedded in the 
skin of the plane to create a view for pilots that is unobstructed by the physical 
aircraft—they can “see” through the floor because they actually are looking at 
the camera images integrated into their visors� In a similar manner, Navy engi-
neers are developing futuristic HUDs capable of embedding information on the 
inside of a diving helmet�5 The underlying concept is the same: to provide an 
operator—particularly an operator in a harsh environment or wearing protective 
gear—critical information that otherwise might be difficult to access or track�
Use of AR technology is not limited to the operational environment� In 
the training field, the Fleet Integrated Synthetic Training/Testing Facility 
(known as FIST2FAC) blends live action with virtual assets and adversaries�6 
Thanks to this unique blend of live action and AR capabilities, sailors can stand 
aboard actual ships and simulate using machine guns to engage multiple fast-
attack craft� The combination yields new training capabilities that otherwise 
would be possible only via an untenable financial investment� In other words, the 
blended training yields maximum training efficiency at minimal cost� This capa-
bility certainly falls under the general umbrella of an offset strategy, by creating 
a new and economically viable military advantage, while also fulfilling the Third 
Offset Strategy intention of enhancing human performance�
To demonstrate the effectiveness of human-machine teaming beyond merely 
providing information to the operator, we will draw on a now-classic example 
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drawn from the game of chess� It once was assumed that machines never would 
be able to outthink humans in this field, but a computer system named Deep 
Blue shattered this assumption when it beat world champion Garry Kasparov in 
1997�7 Now computer systems regularly beat human players—which has spawned 
another evolution� The new format has different names (including three-play 
chess, freestyle chess, centaur chess, and so forth), but the premise is that dur-
ing game play a computer aids the human�8 The human player can ask questions 
of the computer, which then compares various scenarios faster than the human 
could� The human player still makes the decision, but the computer provides 
invaluable aid during the process� The combination is not as simple as a HUD, 
because it involves comparing strategic moves and their consequences before the 
operator actually has to make the move� It is quite possible that future command-
and-control equipment will integrate such technology platforms further into our 
operations� This is in keeping with the theme of “let the computers do what they 
do best, and let the humans do what they do best�”
The development of combined human-machine efforts faces other challenges, 
though, especially as the outcome performance can depend entirely on the spe-
cific machine involved and the specific human in the loop� Thus, the greatest 
challenge in human-machine teaming is trust� Although this phenomenon is not 
new, it remains a pervasive issue� Everyone is enamored of the capabilities of the 
newest computer—until it unexpectedly crashes and you get the “blue screen of 
death�” The driverless car currently is careening toward a wall of passenger mis-
trust that will have to be overcome�9 Third Offset technologies will face similar 
trust issues� Human operators must trust the accuracy and validity of the equip-
ment they are using, or the entire synthesis becomes untenable� For example, the 
U�S� Naval Aviation Safety Center cites spatial disorientation as the number one 
human causal factor of Class A mishaps—the worst category of aviation mishaps, 
those involving more than two million dollars in damage and loss of aircraft, life, 
or both�10 Spatial disorientation can occur in a number of ways, with visual illu-
sions often listed as a primary factor� In a visual-illusion scenario, operating in 
dark environments (or without visual reference points for some other reason) can 
disorient pilots� Despite instrument indications to the contrary, pilots continue to 
trust their eyes over their machine to fly safely—even when their eyes could be 
lying� Unfortunately, this is merely one example; human-machine trust issues are 
all too common� As new technologies are introduced to aid the warfighter, the 
issue has the potential to become much more significant�
Precision Selection and Training
While cyber initiatives will provide superior “machines,” selection and training 
initiatives will be pivotal in ensuring that those machines are integrated with the 
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best possible human operators� The key to success for these selection and train-
ing initiatives will be precision� Traditional military selection and training have 
been a matter of mass production, in which sailors and Marines are treated as 
identical cogs in a giant machine� Current screening tools, such as the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (known as ASVAB), are notoriously blunt 
instruments that ignore the developing science of incorporating physiological, 
neurological, and cognitive components� Furthermore, the military has a long, 
proud tradition of being able to take any motivated man or woman, regardless of 
background or aptitudes, and train him or her to be an effective soldier, sailor, 
Marine, or airman� While this approach may have worked in the era of mass 
armies and large-unit tactics, the fluid battlefield that is characteristic of fourth-
generation warfare and cyber warfare makes this selection and training approach 
obsolete—and risky�
It will not be sufficient to have just any sailor pushed through a training pipe-
line; for the Third Offset Strategy to succeed, the military must push the right 
sailor through the pipeline� In other words, decisions regarding selection and 
training must be made with a precision never seen before in the U�S� military� 
In the world of the Third Offset Strategy, selection and training decisions would 
be more similar to those a doctor makes in treating a patient, involving creating 
an individualized plan designed to achieve the optimal outcome� In fact, the re-
search techniques designed to discover the biomarkers to be used in this new era 
of precision medicine also may help usher in the precision selection and training 
approaches necessary for the success of the Third Offset Strategy�
The difference in warfare environments between current and future opera-
tions further makes this “precision challenge” both timely and apropos� A large, 
blunt training procedure cannot deal with the nuances that the conduct of mul-
tigeneration warfare creates�11 Fortunately, a model already exists for conducting 
this style of military training� The SOFs template is the ideal base on which to 
build� SOFs already embody several aspects that are essential to meeting current 
operational-flexibility demands, including the need to conduct smaller, dispersed 
engagements and perform expedited responses� SOF operators are among our 
best-trained and most capable military personnel� If we are going to build a mold 
from which to cast future operators, SOFs offer an ideal subset to consider in 
determining how to select and train human operators�
The template begins by adopting some of the basic truths applied to special 
warfare for application across a wider segment of the military� The U�S� Army 
Special Operations Command dictates five truths about SOFs, which can serve 
as a philosophical guide for selection and training� The first truth states that 
“[h]umans are more important than hardware�” The fourth truth states that 
“[c]ompetent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies 
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occur�”12 Preparation during peacetime aligns well with the spirit and general 
purpose of an offset strategy� So, from a philosophical perspective, SOFs already 
apply the template for human operators that will be needed to carry out a Third 
Offset Strategy�
Of course, the general purpose of personnel selection and screening is noth-
ing new� For especially important duties, the different service branches long have 
sought better means of selecting and screening personnel, ranging from combat-
readiness evaluations to special-operations training� The question remains the 
same—How will we achieve this end goal?—but the difference now is the tools 
we have at our disposal to make these evaluations� For example, deep-learning 
systems take advantage of “big data” analytics, which can crunch numbers far 
more quickly than human analysts� These advanced analytical approaches can be 
used to enhance our existing selection procedures by using as a starting point the 
personnel we have already, along with the requirements of the duty in question�
This idea sounds rather vague until one considers a specific application� One 
example is that big-data analytics and new research could be used to develop 
a combat-readiness profile (CRP)�13 The CRP would identify numerous physi-
ological, cognitive, and neurological components to predict which individuals 
will have the highest likelihood of performing well under particular combat 
conditions� Physiological variables to be measured might include heart-rate vari-
ability, cognitive factors, and response inhibition; neurological variables might 
include event-related potentials in the brain�14 These rich sources of information 
provide an insight deeper than does outward behavior alone, because they liter-
ally identify activity going on in the hearts and minds of our personnel� Recent 
technological developments have continued to make sensors of these various fac-
tors smaller, more durable, and more practical to employ in otherwise difficult-
to-access environments� By taking advantage of this available yet underused data 
source and big-data analytics, we could evaluate combat readiness in a manner 
never attempted before in military history� The ability to quantify combat readi-
ness on the basis of objective factors could supplement training officer decisions 
by identifying precisely those individuals who are and are not ready for combat—
no matter how they appear to behave under pressure during training�
The potential to select personnel precisely represents an interesting new way 
to enhance operator performance in the Third Offset Strategy: by matching 
the right operator to the right duty at the right time� There is an opportunity 
to take these selection mechanisms one step further by developing new train-
ing methods that are based on human abilities that current military training 
underemphasizes—specifically, cognitive abilities� The idea stems from a con-
cept called “Sharper Minds, Sharper Sailors�”15 Essentially, we currently train 
the bodies of our personnel through physical training and we give them new 
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procedures to execute and new technology to operate� However, the thing that 
operates that body, executes the procedures, and uses the technology—the 
mind—receives no directed training� But if we enhance the mental capabilities 
of our personnel, we could expect to improve operational effectiveness� Thus, 
the Third Offset Strategy takes a rather direct approach to enhancing human 
performance of military duties: by enhancing the human who will be perform-
ing the duty�
The challenge is in identifying how to enhance the individual operator� So-
called brain-training initiatives have purported to cure everything up to and 
including Alzheimer’s disease by having subjects perform a few minutes of 
directed cognitive-training tasks each day� However, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) slapped key elements of the brain-training industry with fines for 
making such grandiose claims with no empirical evidence�16 Even the scientific 
community is somewhat split over the issue, with many lining up to denounce 
the entire brain-training industry, while others proffer the simpler criticism that 
so far the industry has overstepped any reasonable conclusions�17 Scientists still 
are learning which cognitive training platforms can be used as interventions for 
which problems, and how the training methods should be applied� Nonetheless, 
the field holds substantial potential, with promising preliminary results being 
replicated in new studies� For example, alcohol-consumption behaviors can be 
altered by increasing response inhibition for alcohol-related stimuli (e�g�, pictures 
of beer)�18 This example demonstrates how sound science paired with specific 
intent can achieve a worthwhile goal� The success comes from careful applica-
tion of validated scientific methods� In comparison, the brain-training industry 
rushed an idea forward for immediate profit without generating any supportive 
evidence for its claims�
Military research cannot make the same mistake� Developing new training 
techniques must be an evidence-based endeavor� As noted above, response inhi-
bition appears to be a trainable cognitive function, and this cognitive ability has 
direct relevance to combat operations�19 Classic response-inhibition experiments 
often use a “go/no-go” task, in which one stimulus is paired with making a re-
sponse and another stimulus is paired with withholding a response� For example, 
participants in these experiments might hit a key (i�e�, a “go” response) whenever 
they see a green square, but withhold a response (i�e�, a “no-go” response) when-
ever they see a red square� The transition to a military operational environment 
can be very direct—shoot a hostile in a combat zone (i�e�, a “go” response), but 
do not shoot an ally in a combat zone (i�e�, a “no-go” response)� Such a link 
between inhibitory control and either friendly-fire incidents or civilian casual-
ties already has been demonstrated in the psychology literature and, in a more 
direct application to the training issue, there is at least one demonstration that 
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response-inhibition training could reduce the likelihood of inflicting a civilian 
casualty�20
These examples demonstrate how the Third Offset Strategy should pursue 
new training methods to maximize human performance� Specifically, any novel 
approaches should be (1) based on sound science, (2) demonstrated in a context 
relevant to military operations, and (3) replicated in different experiments be-
fore the proof of concept is turned into a concept of operations� For example, we 
should not hesitate to explore novel technologies, such as transcranial stimula-
tion, to enhance human cognitive performance, as well as to leverage our under-
standing of the neurobiology of fatigue to mitigate its adverse cognitive effects�
A REALISTIC BALANCE BETWEEN HUMAN OPERATORS AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL GOALS
Our argument is that an agenda that addresses enhanced human performance 
would satisfy best the timeline, priorities, and deliverables that our current op-
erators face� Still, any Third Offset Strategy argument should not address simply 
satisfying these criteria; rather, the discussion should hinge on these criteria 
themselves� Anything discussed should focus on realistic R&D goals that achieve 
some measure of increased operational readiness or expanded force capabilities� 
For example, consider two novel technologies currently under discussion for 
fulfilling future naval purposes: AR and AI� The question then becomes whether 
AR or AI systems meet our three needs of priorities, tangible deliverables, and a 
timeline (i�e�, which technology should be our focus?)�
AR technology exists today in an ever-growing commercial market, and it 
would be easy to program the scenarios to fulfill military requirements� But how 
well does AR match up against our three needs—does it match our priorities? 
Yes� One of our greatest challenges at the moment is that our new strategies must 
be flexible and must adapt to a wide array of adversaries, including the “4+1” 
concept that identifies four potential adversary states (Russia, China, Iran, and 
North Korea) and various nonstate actors (e�g�, terrorist organizations)�21 Each 
possible adversary presents different challenges, so our training and operational 
activities must be flexible enough to adapt to and overcome those challenges� AR 
training can be programmed to mimic a wide array of situations, from operat-
ing a gunner platform firing at fast-attack craft to planning high-volume troop 
movements� AR also can provide advanced operational capabilities, such as the 
various information displays within the F-35 helmet� Does AR provide tangible 
deliverables? Yes� In the near future new technological capabilities could be 
demonstrated that would provide the needed equipment, and we can measure 
human-performance differences to determine their operational impact� Can AR 
meet a realistic timeline? Yes, the technology as it exists today can be adapted to 
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fit any of these suggested purposes� AR systems represent an ideal technological 
template for Third Offset improvements and investments�
AI systems could alter the battle space dramatically, with thinking machines 
adapting to overcome new problems faster than communication signals could be 
relayed to an operator� An entire army of thinking machines could overwhelm an 
enemy battalion without ever losing a human life� The idea already is swimming 
about in the conceptual seas of both allies and adversaries; Russian general Valery 
Gerasimov recently predicted a future battlefield populated by learning machines 
rather than humans�22
But as interesting as these possibilities may be, would drones or some other 
form of AI meet our three needs? Is overwhelming our enemies a priority? Ab-
solutely� Does AI offer tangible deliverables? Yes—but in enough different forms 
that an acquisitions officer could go from butter bar (O-1) to full bird (O-6) 
before seeing a final, delivered product� Is such a timeline acceptable? Defi-
nitely not� We should continue to invest in these capabilities—their potential is 
nearly endless and the technology could revolutionize warfare� But will swarms 
of drones dominate the battlefield by 2030, or even 2040? Given the challenges of 
technology development, infrastructure, manufacture, and acquisition, the safe 
answer is no�
Typically from this point, Third Offset Strategy writings would continue down 
the road of discussing technological opportunities, but we are focusing on en-
hancing human opportunities� However, confusion can arise when discussing the 
source of these enhancements� We are not suggesting that human performance 
should be enhanced separate from advancing technology; we are suggesting that 
human performance should be enhanced through technology� Advanced tech-
nological capabilities will provide new opportunities to achieve optimal human 
performance� This approach adheres to the theme of “let the computers do what 
they do best, and let the humans do what they do best�” Computers can process 
information faster than human operators, so let the computers crunch the num-
bers; human operators can make decisions that incorporate a level of context and 
consequence that computers cannot, so let the humans make the decisions�
A CULTURAL CHANGE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PURSUING 
HUMAN-PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT
The ideas introduced thus far largely are novel in and of themselves, and inte-
grating them into our ongoing operations—making them a reality—will require 
changes in the areas of personnel, equipment, and funding� But several sugges-
tions would require more: major cultural changes�
One important issue deriving from the advancements in cyber capabilities was 
referred to earlier: that the most effective warriors may be the sailors, airmen, 
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or others who remotely pilot vehicles that have a direct battlefield impact� This 
idea seems to conflict with our advocacy of a SOF-type approach to personnel 
selection and training, but the two elements actually dovetail quite well� Preci-
sion selection procedures can be applied to both realms; the difference is in the 
abilities assessed to select operators to fill various roles� Some selection proce-
dures will focus more on the overtly physical (e�g�, physical fitness evaluations, 
long-distance swims, etc�), whereas others will focus more on response speed 
and fine-motor control (e�g�, hitting buttons quickly, making microadjustments 
with joysticks)� However, this differentiation merely reflects variations in specific 
procedures; the greater challenge will require effecting cultural changes in how 
we view certain training and procedures�
The first cultural change involves an emerging trend regarding the battle 
space, not the battlefield� Battle space quickly is coming to be defined by multiple 
entities operating in multiple locations across multiple platforms� Whereas we 
once fought the battle of Saratoga in upper New York State, a future “battle of 
Saratoga” may involve airmen in Saratoga operating remotely piloted vehicles 
to survey a land area in Iran, causing fighter jets (or maybe even other drone 
aircraft) to launch from an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf to strike a location 
in Syria� This is battle space, not a battlefield—multiple domains coordinated in 
real time to conduct operations across the world�
This aspect is actually the cultural change that most in the military will accept 
readily� The real cultural change will be to take those same procedures and ideas 
that we have applied only to special operators and apply them to our larger force� 
If drone pilots may be launching aircraft from Colorado to aid special operators 
in the Middle East, we must hold those operators to the same standards as our 
special operators in theater—perhaps not in the number of push-ups performed 
or the marksmanship exhibited, but in remaining in the top 1 percent for reaction 
time or fine-motor control�
More than that, the same principles applied to special operators could apply 
elsewhere� For example, consider the special operations truth cited earlier that 
“[h]umans are more important than hardware�” Our best and most advanced tac-
tical aircraft—manned or unmanned—are nothing but expensive paperweights 
without their operators� As noted earlier, “[c]ompetent Special Operations Forces 
cannot be created after emergencies occur�” If we need a flexible force operating 
aircraft from stateside to fight overseas, then its personnel must be ready before 
the emergency occurs� Those operators may not have to sleep in camp tents 
or fend off desert bugs at night, but they still have to be ready when the alarm 
sounds� We still train for the top 1 percent of operators; why should the underly-
ing selection and training principles for our special drone operators be different 
from those applied to our special operators in the field?
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To employ a common metaphor, we are talking about changing how we view 
the “tip of the spear�” The spear no longer is hurled at the enemy by one person� 
Many highly trained operators from many different locations are coordinating 
to throw “spears” that are far more sophisticated� However, if the tip of the spear 
is no longer isolated to one physical location—the battlefield as we knew it—
then sharpening that spear means keeping it sharp everywhere it will be lifted� 
Personnel-wise, this includes the special operator on the ground, the drone op-
erator conducting reconnaissance, and others� Sharpening the spear in this sense 
means identifying the best human operators and enhancing their performance to 
peak levels� SOF truths are the perfect model to guide us in applying these ideas 
to human operators outside of SOFs�
Another big cultural change involves how we go about making these ideas a 
reality� As mentioned earlier—and proudly reaffirmed here—the military has a 
long tradition of being able to take any motivated man or woman, regardless of 
background, and train him or her to be an effective soldier, sailor, Marine, or air-
man� The current operational model is akin to that of a factory machine� The goal 
is to take raw material and conduct training until all aspects of that raw material 
perform and function in the same way� For more-specialized operations, we se-
lect people for the necessary roles on the basis of existing capabilities: Can they 
pass the test, or survive the experience?
Our take on precision selection directly contradicts this process� We do not 
provide the same training to everyone; rather, we identify individual strengths 
and weaknesses and train individuals to reach a given standard� Identifying 
training opportunities that address individual weaknesses enhances the training 
process� We help the individual achieve the necessary standard faster by identify-
ing his or her current individual capabilities and focusing on those areas that are 
not yet up to standard� Sailor Smith and Sailor Jones no longer get all the same 
procedures—some, to be sure, but not all� Sailor Smith receives the training he 
needs, and Sailor Jones receives the training she needs�
This process can be focused all the way down to a cognitive level because per-
formance problems can occur for many reasons, such as insufficient sleep or low 
morale or poor cognitive functioning� The roadblock that must be negotiated is 
the identification of the criteria on which we would make these precision selec-
tion and training assessments� We need new procedures that identify cognitive 
skills and capabilities that current training does not address directly�
This approach can achieve optimal human performance, and it represents the 
greatest opportunity for the Third Offset Strategy to have a real and long-lasting 
impact on U�S� military operations� However, it will require a basic shift in how 
we consider and pursue selection and training—a shift that can begin by adapting 
SOF principles and truths to a wider array of military activities�
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COMPARING OFFSET STRATEGIES:  
WHAT SHOULD WE LEARN FROM PREVIOUS INSTANCES?
As its name makes obvious, the Third Offset Strategy is not the first of its kind� 
We have been down this road and used this approach to great effect throughout 
the latter half of the twentieth century� The previous examples can provide more 
than just historical context� Lessons learned from the previous strategies can be 
applied to the Third Offset Strategy to ensure its greatest possible effect�
The discussion that follows of the First and Second Offset Strategies will ad-
dress the following questions: 
1� What constitutes an offset strategy?
2� In the previous offset strategies, what considerations were given to the 
human operator?
3� What factors created the longest-lasting benefits?
4� What factors created the most-volatile situations?
Defining an Offset Strategy
While the term offset strategy has entered military jargon fully, there does not 
appear to be a consensus on what qualifies an approach as an offset strategy� 
Recent communications from senior DoD officials have called for a Third Offset 
Strategy, but these mostly provided a general direction and a common language 
for discussions about military R&D priorities in the early twenty-first century�23 
Other writings have described a variety of technologies that the Third Offset 
Strategy should pursue�24 Perhaps the only universally agreed-upon point with 
regard to the Third Offset Strategy is that we are reaching an era in which Ameri-
can dominance on multiple fronts—sea, sky, space, and cyberspace—no longer 
can be taken for granted�25 But what is an offset strategy, and why would having 
one help us now?
One definition of an offset strategy as a military tactic relies on the following 
three criteria:
1� Asymmetrical advantage: A nation seeks to compensate for a military 
disadvantage or force disequilibrium by attaining an advantage the 
adversary cannot match�
2� Unconventional approach: Simply increasing the size of existing forces 
to achieve the desired military advantage is not an option owing to fiscal, 
political, or practical constraints� Instead, a nation pursues some novel 
approach—through tactics, technology, or some combination thereof—to 
achieve the advantage�
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3� Long-term sustainability: The novel solution must be sustainable over the 
long term, without an excessive drain on the national economy or military 
budgets�26
An interesting note is that, when taken together, the latter two criteria produce 
a maxim for an offset strategy: maximum deterrence at minimal cost� An offset 
strategy gives a military an advantage that an opposing country cannot match; it 
accomplishes this goal by using unconventional means, primarily aimed at deter-
rence; and the military maintains this advantage for a long period� This maxim 
also indicates why a nation might pursue a particular course of action� Generally 
speaking, practicing deterrence is an economically efficient approach that does 
not require a nation to relinquish its military advantage�
Historical Context of the Previous Offset Strategies
Two previous cases in U�S� history often are held up as examples of offset strate-
gies� The First Offset Strategy originally was called the New Look� The most 
narrow sense of the term merely described the DoD budget for fiscal year 1955�27 
During the Cold War, the United States faced a monolithic adversary in the Soviet 
Union� Matching Soviet conventional resources would have cost the United States 
more than three times its entire defense budget, which would have led to an “un-
bearable security burden leading to economic disaster�”28 President Eisenhower 
and his administration decided to shift tactics� They found a military advantage 
that would deter the Soviets without needing to match conventional forces—the 
First Offset Strategy�29 In short, they offset a conventional weapons disadvan-
tage with a nuclear weapons advantage� The United States thus opted to pursue 
nuclear deterrence via a policy of massive retaliation rather than by matching 
conventional forces�30 The First Offset Strategy appears to have been successful 
for a time—military expenditures, as a percentage of the total budget, declined, 
without sacrificing overall U�S� military strength�31
The Second Offset Strategy began to emerge once the Soviet Union neutral-
ized the U�S� nuclear advantage� With mutually assured destruction a reality, both 
nations could rely on conventional forces only, and in that area the Soviet Union 
still held a mammoth advantage over the United States�32 Again, matching those 
conventional forces would have bankrupted the United States and NATO� (Thus, 
economic concerns emerge yet again as a critical factor in determining why a na-
tion would pursue an offset strategy instead of conventional superiority�) The so-
lution came not in nuclear yield but through precision� The trick was to take hu-
man error—the inaccuracy of human operation of the targeting systems—out of 
the equation, so as to guarantee mission accomplishment� The role of the human 
operator changed in the Second Offset Strategy; precision accuracy was achieved 
through technology, not via human aim� The result exceeded all expectations� By 
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1984, a top Soviet official called one Second Offset program, Assault Breaker, a 
“military-technical revolution,” a formulation that morphed into the American 
axiom “a revolution in military affairs�”33 American precision capabilities could 
destroy two thousand Soviet tanks, from miles from the front lines, in less than 
a day�34 Second Offset advantages put American capabilities ahead of Soviet con-
ventional forces—yet again without having to attempt the unsustainable invest-
ment necessary to match forces soldier for soldier�
Ultimately, the United States managed to maintain a military advantage with-
out experiencing economic collapse, whereas the Soviet Union did not fare so 
well� Many different factors contributed to the eventual dissolution of the Soviet 
Union—which factor was most influential is debatable—but economic issues 
certainly contributed�35
Second Offset Strategy advantages proved durable over decades, leading to 
continued U�S� military successes� Both Gulf Wars demonstrated the advantage 
of Second Offset technologies over adversaries unable to match that technology�
Lessons Learned: The Role of the Human Operator in Previous Offset Strategies
With regard to the First Offset Strategy, human operators armed with conven-
tional weapons represented an unsustainable economic weakness—the United 
States could not attempt to match its forces against Soviet-led capabilities� It also 
could be argued that large armies represented a tactical vulnerability; after all, in 
the nuclear world, large standing armies became optimal targets that could be 
eliminated with a few nuclear bombs� Another consideration of the First Offset 
Strategy was a secondary, but no less important, liability: the dependence on 
error-prone, sometimes unpredictable, human operators�
The Cuban missile crisis demonstrated this issue, although the specific inci-
dent in question is not widely known� Typically, Soviet submarines could launch 
nuclear weapons if the captain and political officer agreed to the action� Aboard 
B-59, however, nuclear launch required the approval of a third officer: Vasili 
Arkhipov� He was second in command of B-59, yet also commander of the sub-
marine flotilla� This authority made him equal in rank to the captain and gave 
him a say in whether nuclear weapons could be launched� When several practice 
signaling depth charges dropped by USS Beale (DD 471) struck the boat’s hull 
on October 27, 1962, the captain and political officer wanted to launch a nuclear 
torpedo against the U�S� fleet�36 Only Arkhipov disagreed—thereby preventing an 
action that likely would have escalated the confrontation into full-scale nuclear 
war�37
Because of the tactics involved in the application of the First Offset Strategy, 
tens of millions of American lives came down to the actions of a single man—
and not even a member of the American military� He easily could have acted 
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differently; in fact, two of the three men in his situation, on the same submarine, 
did act differently� While we are all thankful for Arkhipov’s discretion, the events 
on B-59 reveal the potential danger of trusting so many individual human opera-
tors to execute reliably a First Offset Strategy that relied on a consistent willing-
ness to use the apocalyptic power of nuclear weapons when necessary� Thus, 
the human operator represented a multifaceted liability within the First Offset 
Strategy�
For the Second Offset Strategy, the human operator shifted from being a li-
ability to a cog in the machine—a button pusher� Precision guidance required 
taking the human out of the targeting systems as much as possible and letting 
computer systems guide our birds to their targets� While the extent to which pre-
cision guidance relegated human operators to being mere button pushers could 
be argued, it is clear that the role of the human operator changed significantly� In 
many cases, once a decision to engage the enemy was made the human operator 
was consigned to being a bystander�
Beyond considering the role of the human operator in each strategy, we can 
learn from what each strategy did effectively� The First Offset Strategy did suc-
ceed, although its advantages were volatile and short-lived� Its continuing contri-
bution is the concept of mutually assured destruction; however, today this reality 
affects our immediate and practical operations very little� A weakness of the First 
Offset Strategy was that its tactical contributions were eliminated almost entirely 
once other countries achieved nuclear parity� The Second Offset Strategy fared 
much better in that regard� Specifically, precision weapons are as useful today 
as they were in the 1980s� We have not discarded these capabilities, and they 
continue to impact our ongoing operations� The Second Offset Strategy had to 
start fresh because it could not build on the advantages the First Offset Strategy 
had achieved� The Third Offset Strategy can build on Second Offset Strategy 
advantages, and that aspect should be considered as we plan for the new strategy� 
Our long-term goals should be to develop capabilities that future developments 
cannot simply eliminate or overwhelm� This idea further confirms enhanced 
human performance as an ideal focus for the Third Offset Strategy, because the 
performance procedures we develop now will continue to be useful long after the 
Third Offset Strategy itself enters the history books�
Another important difference between the emerging offset strategy and its 
predecessors involves how we will pursue these technologies� Unlike the earlier 
approaches, we are well aware that a new strategy is emerging; whereas the pre-
vious strategies scrambled to address existing challenges, this time we have the 
opportunity to be proactive� This awareness allows us to design our approach 
in a more deliberate fashion than with the previous methodologies� This point 
becomes more important given that the Third Offset Strategy is really a series 
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of smaller strategies all working toward the eventual overall goal of enhanced 
human performance� To that end, we can construct a more theoretical guide to 
identify, describe, and structure concurrent efforts�
The United States employed two offset strategies during the twentieth century 
as means of creating viable and sustainable military deterrents� The First Offset 
Strategy developed principles of nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation that, 
while effective at the time, were flawed in that they treated the human being as a 
necessary liability� Both offset strategies were employed to great effect and main-
tained a military advantage throughout the latter twentieth century at a minimal 
cost� This fiscal component proved vitally important, as the continual buildup of 
conventional military forces contributed to the collapse of the Soviet economy, 
while the U�S� economy endured�
Unfortunately, the significance of precision weapons in maintaining a military 
advantage is dwindling as other nations develop similar technologies� The revolu-
tion in communication and information technologies as well as the involvement 
of nonstate actors has created challenges never before seen� Additionally, the 
advent of fourth-generation warfare and cyber warfare threatens to make Second 
Offset technologies less relevant�38 A new offset strategy is required� Although the 
Third Offset Strategy remains in its earliest stages of development, central to its 
success will be the human operator� Current and future battle spaces will be glob-
al and multidimensional, with the only common element across the dimensions 
Offset Strategy U.S. Personnel Adversary Personnel
First Offset: nuclear 
deterrence
Liability: The economic and logistical 
challenges of fielding U�S� personnel in the 
numbers necessary to win a conventional 
war made them a liability�
Tyranny of numbers: The Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact could field an army 
in Europe substantially larger than NATO 
was willing to support�
Second Offset: precision 
conventional weapons
Source of error: The complexity of the 
modern battle space exceeded the capa-
bilities of the human being to engage the 
enemy effectively and rapidly without un-
acceptable errors, requiring development 
of strategies to remove the human element 
to the extent possible�
Remote and hidden: Nonstate actors strike 
from locations hidden in urban environ-
ments, while more-traditional state enemy 
forces hide behind a shield of overwhelm-
ing numbers of conventional weapons� 
Both scenarios create a tremendously 
complex battle space�
Third Offset: enhanced 
human performance
Strategy focus: Astonishing advances in 
information technologies allow presenta-
tion of an overwhelming array of data to 
human operators and their commanders� 
Enhancing the physical, cognitive, and 
decision-making capabilities of the human 
operator becomes central to successful 
military operations�
Flexible: Advances in cyber (Internet, 
mobile communications, etc�) and other 
technologies allow enemy personnel to 
operate without the limitation of state 
borders� Management and synthesis of 
complex data from multiple sources are 
required to track and target enemy per-
sonnel effectively�
THE HUMAN IMPACT ON OFFSET STRATEGIES
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being the human being� By emphasizing the human element, the Third Offset 
Strategy can create an asymmetrical advantage that potential adversaries will be 
unable to match� Previous offset strategies limited the human element; the First 
Offset Strategy viewed the human operator as a fiscal liability (i�e�, maintaining 
conventional strength could be considered too expensive compared with main-
taining nuclear weapons), and the Second Offset Strategy tried to minimize hu-
man error by removing the human from the equation as much as possible�
Now we propose the opposite: to maximize human performance through 
emerging technology and new systems, from human-machine combat teaming to 
assisted human operations�39 This new offset strategy incorporates distinct roles 
for both technological innovation and the human operator, as well as leveraging 
the capabilities of both to create an advantage greater than either could achieve 
alone�40 To provide platforms for these new capabilities, we propose efforts in 
three key areas� 
• Cyber initiatives and “big data” can sustain operations in previously denied 
environments, process information more quickly than human operators 
could, and ensure that the most-reliable and most-accurate information is 
delivered to the operator�
• Human-machine teaming will become essential for both operations and 
training, but this integration presents a host of new challenges for which 
Third Offset Strategy initiatives must prepare�
• Precision selection and training can produce the individual enhancement 
and flexibility our future forces will require, and we should build this preci-
sion model on the truths embraced by SOFs and using all available tools, 
including those being pioneered as part of the precision medicine revolution� 
Ultimately, the Third Offset Strategy should take a new tack, one that seeks 
to maximize human performance by using new evidence-based technologies to 
provide task-specific personnel selection; create individualized, competency-
driven training; optimize the operator’s physical, cognitive, emotional, and 
decision-making abilities; and augment warfighter capabilities in the field 
through well-researched and proven human-machine integration� In short, as 
the fundamental framework for a successful Third Offset Strategy, we propose a 
Performance Enhancement Triad consisting of cyber initiatives, human-machine 
integration, and precision selection/training� Constructing each component of 
the triad will require a broad strategic investment in an equally broad array of 
technologies� Working across these three domains, the ultimate goal will be the 
enhancement of human performance� Although constituting a dramatically dif-
ferent philosophical approach and practical application from the previous offset 
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